Deterrence became inevitable for Pakistan in 1974

The nuclear age came out of desperation

When World War I ended, millions of soldiers lay dead. The European generals had created industrial slaughter never before seen. The nuclear physicists who emerged from this crucible understood one thing: the next war would demand a weapon so devastating that no general could afford to wage it.

Germany, desperate by the late 1930s, began theoretical research on nuclear weapons under Dr. Heisenberg. When American intelligence discovered this, the response was swift. The Manhattan Project brought together the world’s best physicists in secret laboratories, led by Dr. Robert Oppenheimer. When nuclear bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Oppenheimer reportedly said, “Now I have become death, the destroyer of worlds.”

Shahid Raza explains the mindset of that era. “The military planners believed they needed a weapon to end all wars,” he says. “Chemical weapons had killed millions in the trenches. Nuclear weapons were to be the ultimate deterrent.”

India’s peaceful nuclear device changed everything

After partition, Pakistan was surrounded. To the north and west lay the Soviet Union and China, both nuclear powers by the early 1960s. To the east sat India, nominally non-aligned but increasingly close to the Soviet Union.

India benefited from the Atoms for Peace program, an initiative by US President Eisenhower to democratize nuclear technology. Under this banner, Canada and France transferred nuclear knowledge to India. India established its atomic energy program in 1957, always insisting it was purely for peaceful purposes.

But by 1968, Pakistan’s intelligence confirmed what had long been suspected: India was secretly weaponizing its civil nuclear capability.

The turning point came in 1974. Precisely two years after Pakistan’s defeat in the 1971 war and the birth of Bangladesh, India tested what it called the Smiling Buddha. A peaceful nuclear device, they claimed, with ironic dishonesty.

“In 1974, India nuclearized South Asia,” Raza says. “Now Pakistan faced a border with three nuclear powers. China, Russia, and now India. Deterrence became the only option.”

Bhutto’s bet on the impossible

Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto understood the stakes. In 1973, before India’s test, he convened a secret meeting in Multan with Pakistan’s top scientists. The question was direct: can we build a nuclear weapon?

Three scientists answered. Dr. Munir from the Atomic Energy Commission. Dr. Abdus Salam, the Nobel Laureate. And one other expert. All said yes. When Bhutto asked how long, they answered five years.

Bhutto put three fingers on the table. “Do it in three years. I will find the money. We will eat grass, but we will develop nuclear deterrence.”

This was not bluster. Pakistan’s economy was shattered. But Bhutto understood something deeper: without nuclear weapons, India would have no reason to negotiate with Pakistan as an equal. The only way to prevent escalation was to raise the cost of aggression so high that invasion became irrational.

Raza credits Dr. Abdus Salam as critical to the enterprise. “Some in the West celebrate Abdus Salam while condemning Pakistan’s nuclear program. But Salam understood Pakistan’s geopolitical situation. Without deterrence, Pakistan faced potential dismemberment.”

From 1974 to 1998: the long buildup

Twenty-four years passed. India tested again in 1998, detonating multiple devices including a thermonuclear weapon, though reportedly it failed to reach full yield. India announced Pokharan II to the world as proof of its thermonuclear mastery.

Pakistan faced a choice. Continue development in secret, or demonstrate capability immediately. The government chose the latter.

“Pakistan tested six devices in 1998, all in the same location, over just a few days,” Raza explains. “All were successful. International observers, seismic monitoring stations, and the Federation of American Scientists confirmed the tests. This wasn’t crude or desperate. This was controlled, coordinated, and technically sophisticated.”

The triad and tactical doctrine

Pakistan built a nuclear triad: land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft delivery, and sea-based systems including submarine-launched cruise missiles. The navy acquired conventional submarines capable of carrying nuclear-armed Babur missiles.

But Pakistan also adopted something more sophisticated: tactical nuclear weapons. When India developed its integrated strike corps doctrine, inspired by Cold War Soviet plans, Pakistan responded with what it called a New Concept of War Fighting.

“If an Indian strike corps crosses into Pakistani territory, we have the right to neutralize it,” Raza says. “Tactical nuclear weapons deployed within our own borders can achieve this without strategic escalation. America deployed tactical nukes in Germany during the Cold War for the same reason.”

Beyond bombs: civil nuclear energy

But nuclear technology extends far beyond weapons. Pakistan established the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, PINSTEC, and other institutions developing civilian applications.

Pakistan currently operates reactors producing 1,400 megawatts. K2, newly commissioned, produces an additional 1,100 megawatts and can power 4 million Pakistani homes. It reduces Pakistan’s carbon footprint by 8.16 million tons annually. K3 is under construction.

Pakistani scientists use nuclear technology for crop mutation research, creating seeds resistant to climate stress without genetic modification. Soil labs across the country use nuclear methods to analyze land fertility and guide agricultural investment.

Safety and the international record

Western media often portrays Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal as precarious. But Pakistan ranks consistently above India in nuclear security assessments conducted by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, improving its ranking every year.

“Pakistan has a multi-tiered security regime,” Raza says. “Physical protection, material controls, legal frameworks, international agreements, training, and the most advanced third-generation reactors with passive cooling and computerized emergency controls. The facts speak for themselves.”

Muzamil asks the fundamental question: why did Pakistan pursue nuclear weapons? The answer is not ideology. It is geography. Surrounded by nuclear powers, facing a much larger nuclear rival, Pakistan chose the only path available: to make the cost of conquest prohibitively high. Deterrence, in the end, was an insurance policy for survival.