Thought Behind Things · Aug 16, 2021 · 57:10
Why the Taliban took Afghanistan in days, not months
Recorded the weekend Kabul fell, Hussain Nadim walks through why the Taliban swept Afghanistan so quickly, why Washington's analysts missed it, what the #SanctionPakistan trend actually was, and what comes next for Pakistan.
with Hussain Nadim
11 min read
A conversation recorded the weekend Kabul fell
The episode opens with Muzamil welcoming Hussain Nadim back to Thought Behind Things, noting that the situation in Afghanistan is moving so quickly that the reason for calling him in again is simply that no one else is going to explain it as clearly. They are recording on a Sunday. The episode will go live on Monday night. Muzamil says it openly: by the time anyone hears this, the facts on the ground will have moved.
Hussain frames the moment before answering any specific question. For the Kabul government, he says, what is happening is panic. For ordinary Afghans, it is something closer to relief — forty years of broken conditions, finally meeting some kind of settlement. He notes that Pakistan’s leadership, including Imran Khan and the military, had visited months earlier and repeatedly advised the Ghani government to negotiate from a position of relative strength. “Now is the right time to do it when you have some level of stability and power,” he recalls them saying. The advice was ignored. Instead, the Ghani administration spent its remaining political capital attacking Pakistan, and lost what Hussain calls the “one chance of stability and graceful exit.”
Why the takeover was fast — and why it shouldn’t have been a surprise
Muzamil names the thing that has confused him for months. He has done, by his count, seven or eight episodes on Afghanistan in the preceding period. The consistent forecast was civil war after the Americans left. The expectation was that things would evolve after September 11. Instead, on a Thursday night, the conversation shifted to whether Kabul could fall in thirty days. Two hours later, the figure on Twitter was seventy-two hours. “How are the Taliban able to take over so quickly?”
Hussain’s answer is that the question contains its own mistake. The takeover was not fast. “There was not much for the Taliban to not take over,” he says. The conditions had been drifting in this direction since around 2007. The ground was already theirs in practice. What changed was the formal acknowledgement of a fact that everyone on the ground had already absorbed.
He adds a line that Muzamil sits with. “It’s less of a victory of the Taliban” than a collapse of what stood opposite them. On one side, an Awan government dependent on foreign forces, with no real legitimacy and no functional governance structure, where police were extracting bribes and the military’s strength included ghost soldiers padding the official count. On the other side, a movement that — whatever one thought of its hard brand of Islamism — was at least providing some local-level protection. “All politics is eventually local,” Hussain says. The Americans tried to frame Afghanistan as a liberal-versus-conservative story. For ordinary Afghans, it was a matter of life, and it needed to be treated that way.
”Big analysts’ careers should end here”
A recurring theme in the conversation is the intellectual failure of the people paid to predict this. Hussain is blunt: “Big analysts’ careers should end here, if they have any shame.” Muzamil reinforces the point with his own observation that the Taliban appear to have flipped governor after governor without firing a shot — operating, in his words, “as a real, very smart political force,” not the barbaric, uneducated warriors the analysis had described.
Hussain extends the argument. The Americans, he says, eventually realised that the Taliban — with barely any funding and barely any resources — had built an organisational structure, a devolution of power, and a continuity of leadership that the Afghan National Security Forces never matched, despite around seventy billion dollars of US investment. He draws the underlying lesson out: “Power is not defined by how many tanks you have. Power in our region is defined by how long you can fight. The Taliban basically said: you have all the watches, we have all the time.”
America, he says, did not fight a twenty-year war. It fought a one-year war twenty times, with a new commander each rotation. The Taliban’s chain ran from Mullah Omar onward without interruption.
#SanctionPakistan and what the data actually said
Muzamil turns to the social-media episode that ran on Twitter and even reached CNN that week — the hashtag campaign calling for sanctions on Pakistan. He asks Hussain, whose work at IPRIT includes monitoring this kind of activity, what they found when they actually looked at the data.
Hussain calls it “the most unfortunate and yet the most revealing” thing to happen in that period. Revealing, because while the Taliban were advancing on the ground, the Afghan elite was on Twitter trying to trend a hashtag. “There’s such a big disconnect between the Afghan elite, who can’t get out of their Twitter bubble, and the Afghan awam, which is supporting the idea that yes, this should end.”
The numerical finding is what stayed with Muzamil. Hussain’s team, along with others, analysed the bot activity behind the hashtag. The estimates ranged across analyses — 45% on the low end, 80% on the high end. Hussain’s own number is 65% artificial bot activity. The campaign was not run from Afghanistan and was not catching on in America. It was, in his reading, a constructed impression aimed at three targets in sequence: discrediting and demoralising the Pakistan army; fanning Pashtun and Baloch nationalism inside Pakistan (an absurd line, he notes, given that Pakistan currently has a Pashtun-led federal government and a Pashtun provincial setup); and undermining CPEC. His final point on this is methodological: “Fake news cannot be fought with fake news. It can only be fought with data, evidence, transparency.”
How Washington missed it — and why Pakistan’s advisory role was wasted
Muzamil’s next question is the one Hussain says he is already writing about: how did the American establishment, with a presence on the ground, intelligence assets in the country, and a direct channel to the Taliban in Qatar, not see this coming?
Hussain gives a figure. The CIA spends roughly thirteen billion dollars a year on research — a budget comparable to the size of Pakistan’s entire economy, just for research. And even with that, the commentary from three or four weeks before the recording was still that the ANSF would hold and that Kabul would not fall.
The deeper failure, in his view, is structural. America went into Afghanistan after 9/11 with no Afghanistan experts in Washington. It turned to Pakistan — and the most valuable thing Pakistan was offering was not airbases or logistics. It was advisory. As early as October 2001, Hussain says, Pakistani officials had told the Americans: you’ve achieved what you came to achieve, the Taliban are pushed back, Mullah Omar is on the run — now negotiate a political settlement and exit gracefully.
The Americans said no. Pakistan kept making the same case in 2003, 2004, 2005. By around 2006 or 2007, Washington was openly blaming Pakistan instead. Twelve years in, Hussain says, US officials privately conceded that Pakistan had been right; they would not say it publicly because of the embarrassment. He closes the section by naming what he thinks Pakistanis themselves need to internalise: the assumption that a scholar from the West is automatically more credible than a Pakistani analyst is itself a part of the problem.
TTP, the Afghan Taliban, and what Pakistan should actually fear
Muzamil raises a worry he has been hearing from people in Pakistan: that a Taliban victory in Afghanistan will translate into a wave of Islamisation and terrorist activity inside Pakistan. He asks Hussain to separate Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan from the Afghan Taliban, and to say plainly what Pakistan should and should not be afraid of.
Hussain is clear that they are two different organisations. The Afghan Taliban’s stated aim is foreign forces out and Afghan self-determination — a position he considers, on its own terms, defensible. The TTP is something else: a group that emerged from Waziristan, predominantly Mehsud, whose aims are aggressive against the Pakistani state. The TTP, he says, has more or less been broken, with sleeper cells still operating but the organisation itself no longer what it was.
What Hussain does want Pakistan to take seriously is a structural parallel. Afghanistan, he says, was not always the place it became. Three things made it what it is: deep-rooted corruption, systemic failure of the justice system, and a youth bulge. The Taliban’s ranks are largely under twenty-five. Pakistan has all three conditions. The institutions are stronger, which buys time. But “if our systems don’t reform in two or three years, if the ordinary citizen doesn’t get justice,” the same dynamics that produced the Afghan outcome can produce a Pakistani one. He gives one example without naming the group: a religious organisation that had two hundred and fifty madrasas in 2015 and twenty-five thousand by 2017, and now numbers in the millions.
The conversation also touches the TTP’s recent rebranding around Pashtun and Baloch nationalism, including Telegram channels suddenly producing English-language press releases full of post-colonial vocabulary. Hussain reads this as outside coaching rather than internal evolution. “Their time is up. That I can assure you.”
What a post-takeover Afghanistan might actually look like
Muzamil pushes Hussain to forecast. Will the Taliban try to run all of Afghanistan as a single bloc, or is what is happening now a cleansing of the old system, with a renegotiated national government to follow that includes Abdullah Abdullah and other opposition figures?
Hussain reads it as something closer to the second. The Afghan parliament, he notes, has many regional and ethnic parties; the problem was that a specific elite, hardcore-backed by the Americans, had monopolised the narrative and defined Pakistan as the cause of every problem. Once that monopoly breaks, Hussain expects a more inclusive politics to surface — including pro-Pakistan voices that had been suppressed under the Ghani camp.
His best guess at the structure is a centralised interim setup — a shura, eventually a jirga — that retains most of the existing Afghan bureaucracy and foreign-relations apparatus, takes over and reforms the justice system, and then devolves power to regions through Taliban representatives. He reaches for a historical analogy: the Persian satrap model, where governors ran their regions under an imperial umbrella. “The Taliban can never run a one-size-fits-all system across Afghanistan. There will be power sharing — but under the umbrella and protection of the Taliban for some time.”
Refugees, and what Pakistan is actually being asked to absorb
Muzamil’s last substantive line of questioning is about the refugee crisis everyone had been bracing for. He notes that the worst-case civil war did not materialise, that the Taliban advances were more political than military, and that the border is now fenced and more structured than in previous decades.
Hussain’s reading is that refugee waves are triggered by uncertainty, not by takeovers. “People run when they’re uncertain. When they see a direct bullet coming.” The takeover itself, he says, has been close to “business as usual” in many areas — power grids handed over, daily life continuing. He recalls a BBC Urdu report claiming that music had been banned on a station in a captured area, only for a verified Afghan journalist living there to comment that nothing of the kind had happened. The most useful thing the international community can do, in his framing, is stop importing the Ghani-era narrative on Pakistan and start funding Pakistan to handle the refugee load it will inevitably absorb — to the tune, he suggests, of around five billion dollars in setup support. Otherwise, he warns, “from within those refugees, a new generation of Taliban will emerge.”
Pakistan, America, and the role between the two superpowers
Muzamil closes with the question Hussain has clearly thought about most. How does the Pakistan-US relationship evolve, given Pakistan’s deep ties with China and Washington’s growing posture against Beijing?
Hussain rejects the binary. He does not accept the line that Pakistan and America have only ever had a third-party relationship — Iran in the fifties, the Soviets in the cold war, nuclear in the eighties, al-Qaeda after 2001. Seventy years of security engagement, he argues, produces institutional ties whether either side admits it or not. The Pakistan-US relationship is, at its core, an institutional relationship between the Pentagon and the Pakistan army. The work ahead is to desecuritise it — to add economic and people-to-people layers on top of the militarised one.
His final argument is the one he says he has made directly to American interlocutors. “America needs us ten times more than Pakistan needs America.” Pakistan’s most valuable forward role, in his reading, is not picking a camp but facilitating between China and America — speaking both languages, understanding both systems, and helping to avoid the proxy wars a bipolar competition will otherwise produce.
By the end of the conversation, Hussain returns to the cultural frame he opened with. “We don’t believe in strategic alliances. We believe in friendships. And in friendships, we will sacrifice everything.” Muzamil thanks him, notes that the situation will likely have moved again by the time the episode airs, and closes the show.
Full transcript
सानवाल, ख़लती नौज़ रात. Welcome back to the episode of ThoughtBank. Things आज हमारे साथ मौजूद हैं. एक बहुत ही ख़ास मेहमान जो कि पहले भी हमारे show पर आ चुके हैं उनको. फिर से, बुलाने का मक़सद दिया था कि there is a very, you know, fast evolving situation in Afghanistan right now. And I thought कि, you who better to explain that to us than हुसैन अदीम from इपरीत. Sir, thank you so much for being part of the show.
अभी वह क्या आ रहा है? लेकिन current situation जो है वह different तरीकों से different हिसाब से देखी जा सकती है. कईयों के लिए एक नई शुरुआत हो रही है, कईयों के लिए कुछ ख़त्म हो रहा है. अगर आप काबुल government की बात करें तो उनको panic एक create वाब है. Right. एक तरह से हम लोग खुशी इस बात से हैं कि ताल्बान finally Afghanistan के अंदर जो है कुछ level of settlement आपकी होगी forty years एक आपके हिलात ख़राबते हैं. Right. और कुछ तरीके से problem अच्छा, disconnect का तो यह level है कि मुझे ख़र्चा यह है कि takeover होने के बाद भी शायद यह tweet कर रहे होंगे कि नहीं हम fight करते रहें हैं. ताजिका स्थासे या कहीं और से भी. जो कि side of that part, I think जो अभी यह सब situation वह यह है कि वह जो छह महीने पहले Pakistan government, Prime Minister इमरान खान और जी farming staff, यह इन्होंने visit भी किया था. इन्होंने बार बार Afghanistan government को समझाने की कोशिश की थी. Right. देखिए, now is the right time to do it when you have some level of stability and power. आख़िरत का wait ना, आख़िरत तक का wait ना करें. इन्होंने all the way drag की और उसका देखिए नुक़सान यह भी हुआ कि wait करते करते बजाय से आकर तालिबान से लड़ाई करते हैं. वह उल्टा पक्षान के ऊपर इन्होंने attack शुरू कर दी और वह. तो I think they lost that
one chance of stability and graceful exit जो कि अब वह नहीं मिल रहा उस तरह से. Already panic stricken right now. मुझे यह थोड़ा सा यह बताइएगा because this is for me what the most confusing thing was and I know I've done like at least seven to eight episodes of Afghanistan, in the past four five months और सुनने में बार बार यह आ रहा था कि, you know, it's a it could be a civil war like situation, you know, once Americans leave. So, the idea was September 11 का wait करें और उसके बाद situation evolve करेगी. And then suddenly I'm looking at, you know, like city after city falling. And and I'm I'm shocked. Honestly, अभी तीन, मेरा ख़याला Friday night को या Thursday night को यह बात आई, कि thirty days के अंदर अंदर Kabul can fall. फिर दो घंटे बाद Twitter पर ही आया कि जी seventy two hours में करता वह काबुल. This is a very fast evolving situation. How are the तालिबान able to, you know, take over so quickly? देखिए इसमें यह जो आपने बात की है ना कि किस तरीके से dynamics change हुए हैं?
Situation है ना कि तालिबानी takeover कैसे किया इतनी जल्दी? उसकी बड़ी simple वजूह हाथ है और वह अभी से नहीं है वह दो हज़ार सात से चलती आ रही है. Right. देखिए there was not much for तालिबान to not take over. चीज़ें already उनके control में थीं. उसके बाद वह जो भी वहां पर थे ground के ऊपर और वह तो moral जो था वह यही था कि यार यह take over होना है. हां. और देखिए इसमें मैं आपको एक एक बात आपसे कहूंगा might some people might not agree with that as well कि it's less of a victory of तालिबान.
Mean, why are people accepting the तालिबान so freely? Because outside एक certain narrative build क्या गया? And she said exactly the same thing. She said there are two reasons. एक यह कि तालिबान जो हैं वह swift justice provide करते हैं, security provide करते हैं कि आपकी दुकानों अगर constantly आपको जन आपका business बंद करना पड़ा, यह करना पड़ा, वह करना पड़ा irrespective of the social situation with the तालिबान. The fact is कि, you know, normal life की तरफ़ वापस जाना शुरू होगा Afghanistan.
और दूसरा शिवा saying कि peace. Like, people are so wary of war कि they're, like, you know, whoever can provide peace be ready to go to them. Absolutely. यह issue सही है. देखिए ना यही है और शहेद ज़ान ने बिल्कुल ठीक बात की होगी इस बारे में कि एक तरफ़ आपके Awan government है. Right. For normal people, वह एक government है जो कि foreign बैठता है, जिसकी legitimacy नहीं है, जो कि governance structure नहीं है, police विले जो उनके हैं, वह भते ले रहे हैं. बुरे हिलाते वहां पर. Military जो है वह आधे ghost wars हैं. Ghost आपके Soldiers हैं हां. Warriors हैं, वह आपको पता पता है. दूसरी तरफ एक है जिनको शायद हम agree नहीं करते उनके साथ philosophically. जिनके hard brand of Islamism के हम agree नहीं करते. मगर कमस कम वह local level पर हमें कुछ protection provide कर रहे हैं. Eventually comes down to all politics is eventually local. Right. और यह local issue था जिसको lens different लगाकर America ने वह बना दिया जैसे somehow liberal issue है, conservative issue है देखिए. अमानिस्तान के आम आम आम के लिए liberal conservative issue नहीं है. यह matter of life है और उसको उसी तरह ही treat करना पड़ेगा which is why. आप इस वक्त देखिए तालिबान कितने swiftly अमानिस्तान को take over किए कि बड़े बड़े analyst के career ख़त्म हो जानी चाहिए. बात को अगर थोड़ी भी शर्म हो उनको. हां, मुझे यह बताया particularly
about that. देखिए हमने हमने यह सोचा हुआ था और हमें constantly यह बताया गया कि civil war होगी. This time around the तालिबान seem like very smart negotiators. मतलब आप देखें ना निन्यानवे फीसे जगहों पर तो उन्होंने एक गोली फाइनी की और वह जाकर उन्होंने governor after governor को flip किया essentially जाकर. उन्होंने like they've worked as a real very real very smart political force. बड़ी माध्यम से माध्यम कि shock shockers आ रहे थे ना last week नज़र आया जी वह एक Indian helicopter था takeover हुआ उसका tyre फटा हुआ था मैंने कहा अच्छा चलो इतने सौ veneer. दो दिन पहले Twitter पर आया जी वो तालिबान जो हैं उड़ाते हुए लेकर जा रहे हैं. They're not as हमें दिमाग़ में यह बताया गया कि तालिबान जो हैं they're the like these barbaric, random, uneducated, you know, warriors. The fact is, it seems now based on what we are seeing, they are much more organized and they are much more, you know, as a as a political force. They are much more structured than we had previously thought. I think this is very, one very interesting,
point because यह Americans को भी realize हो गया कि तालिबान with its barely any fundings and barely any resources Yeah. उनकी organizational structure, उनकी devolution of power, उनकी जो total hierarchy रही है, उसे एक बड़े sophisticated तरीके से अपने आप को organize करके Afghanistan के अंदर सीप in रखा है. Right. Compared to वह for जिसको apparently तीन लाख strong job भी कुछ ऐसा पहले तक Biden कह रहे थे कि हमें full confidence है जिनके ऊपर आपने कोई around but सत्तर billion dollar लगाया है. Power जो है ना वह आपकी इस basis पर नहीं है कि आपके पास कितने tank हैं. Right. या आपके पास कितने जहाज हैं, आपके कितने बड़े muscle हैं. हां. Power जो हमारे इलाके हैं ना उनमें define होती है कि आप कितनी देर तक लड़ सकते हैं. Right. तालिबान में basically कहा सकता है ना कि you have all the watches we have all the time. Yeah. Persistence, patience to fight a long war. क्या वह America में थी? वह नहीं थी. America ने एक साल की जंगलड़ी है, बीस बार. बीस बार उन्होंने एक साल की जंग लड़ी है. हर साल ले आऊंगा commander आता रहे. तालिबान का आप देखें वह शुरुआत मुलाओम्बर, brother वह चलते ही आ रहे हैं. There is no, there is continuity. So उस तरह की जंग में इतनी जहां पर आपकी वह एक कि अवनिस्थान में गए गलत लोगों के साथ उन्होंने tie किया वहां पर Warlords and Cortex. Pakistan जो एक शरीफ actor दोस्त था आपका समझाता रहा कि यह गलत है. हां. उसको आपने double game करके कहा जी आप तो side पर हो जाए.
If the तारेबान are actually going from Pakistan, why haven't they taken? Why didn't they take the the Pakistan? जो वो वाले areas जो Pakistan ने ज़्यादा क़रीब थे. Why did they start with the Northern Afghanistan? That does make you think कि, you know, अगर तो Pakistan कर रहा होता तो it would have the whole map would have looked very very differently. यह शुरू शुरू में यह एकदम से narrative उठा कि Pakistan support का रहा है. बीस साल से चला रही हैं. Sponsor का रहा है, support का रहा है, चीज़ें का रहा है. यह सारा narrative kill हो चुका हुआ है. खत्म हो चुका हुआ है सिर्फ एक data का evidence के ऊपर. Right. कि जिस तरीके
से Afghanistan take over हुआ है. Right. वह आपका Pakistan क्या है तो दुनिया की पूरी फौजें भी लग जाती है ना वह कोई take over नहीं हो सकता था. क्यों? क्योंकि वह regions कौन से हैं? वह regions आपके वह हैं जो provinces उनके हिरात. वह आपके regions हैं northern alliances के. उधर तो Pakistan को गुल पहुंचने तक काबुल के through गुज़रना पड़ता है. बिल्कुल. तो how it is unexplainable. Right. जो चीज़ elephant in the room है ना जो स्वाज़ी है कि क्यों तालिबान takeover कह रहा लोग उसको accept नहीं करना चाह रहे हो. यह बार बार reason इसका अमरोला सालेह and रानी जो है उन्होंने यह deflect की है. Governance failure, actual support तालिबान की ground के ऊपर थी. Governance failure हुआ, power vacuum create हुआ, आपकी वह लोगों पर आ गए. अब अगर हम इस चीज़ को deflect करके कहेंगे नहीं जी यह Pakistan की वजह से हो रहा है तो this is ridiculous idea और दूसरा point यह है
in the sense के as a human angle के ऊपर. अब इसके ऊपर अगर हमें गाली भी पड़े तो ठीक है फिर. Right, that makes sense. इसी के साथ अभी प्रशेतन ने एक बहुत major, you know, Twitter group पर hashtag खिलाई. सब तक चला के CNN पर भी वह बोला गया. I was quite shocked. But there was this hashtag sanction Pakistan and I know G5IO and you know you guys are actively you know always looking at कि जो भी internet के ऊपर activity हो रही है उसके background में हो क्या रहा है? How is this narrative and why एक तो यह कि why is this narrative being driven? तो आपने थोड़ा सा बता भी दिया कि you know, एक certain set of failures हैं. ज़ाहिर है कि अगर आप एक political लिख भी है ना. At the end of the day it's a political government. They want to show their people कि यार हम तो बेचारे में scheme मासूम लोग हैं. Actually तो यह evil Pakistan था जिन्होंने कर दिया even though ground reality बिल्कुल फ़र्क होगी. But beyond that as well, you know, we see India, you know, participating in this hashtag as well. A lot of, you know, there are tweets a lot of tweets coming from there. What did you find when you looked at the sanctioned Pakistan? यह sanctioned Pakistan वाला जो episode थी ना दो तीन दिन की जो उन्होंने चलाई है. This is the most unfortunate
and yet the most revealing. जो सबसे ज़्यादा expose करती हैं ना आपकी Afghanistan and India को भी, वह यह थी कि Afghanistan में आगे लगी हुई थी. Right. तालिबान takeover कर रहे हैं. आप supposedly you're supposed to fight back. आप क्या कर रहे हो? आप Twitter पर trend करा रहे हो. इतना बड़ा disconnect है आपका अफ़ग़ान elite का जो कि अपने bubble और Twitter bubble से बाहर नहीं निकलती और अफ़गान आवाम का जो कि support कर रहे हैं कि यार अब ख़त्म करेंगे सही. हां. यह एक disconnect था. भले इसके कि आप चलें लड़ते जाकर तालिबान से. भले इसके कि आप peace deal करें बैठकर. आप क्या कर रहे हैं आप Twitter trend चला रहे हैं पक्षा के ख़िलाफ़. वह partner जो होकर actually आपको दावत दे रहे हैं तीन बार, चार बार के लिए आप आएं, हम आपके साथ negotiate करवाते हैं, हम deal करवा देते हैं. हम बिठाकर आपस में भगवान भाइयों का peace करवा देते हैं और हम ख़ुद भी involve होते हैं उसमें. Right. आपने वह छोड़ा Right. नज़र क्या आता है? देखिए social media की जो traffic है ना लोग समझते कि हम fake account बना लेंगे. लोग समझते हैं कि हम बड़े तरीके से कर लेंगे और हम बचेंगे. हां. It is very visible. Right. एक tweet पता लग जाता है कि एक trend चल रहा है. यह trend start किसने किया? Right. यह trend उठाया किसने? इस trend में कितनी bot activity थी और यह channel कहां कहां से आता है? 65% जो आपकी और मैंने देखा कई different जगहों पर भी, कई जगह 45 है, कई जगह 80% भी आ रहा है. हमारे analysis पर 65% artificial bot activity थी. Right. यानी कि यह तासुर जो है sanction करें Pakistan को यह Afghanistan में भी नहीं चल रहा. Right. यह America पर भी नहीं चल रहा. यह एक तासुर create कर लिए दो America में बैठकर किसी ने पाक्सानी दारे. पाक्सानी government ख़ास हुआ पाक्सान army. उसको आप demoralize करें, controversialize करें, एक target हो. दूसरा सबसे बड़ा target यह कि पश्तून nationalism, बलोश nationalism जो है ना इनको आप Pakistan में fan करें. Right. कि दिखाएं कि जी आपके साथ जाती है और वह बड़ा मज़ेदार बात है कि Pakistan के अंदर इस वक्त पश्तून led government है. Right. आपकी एक पूरे province के अंदर पश्तून government है. आपके majority prime minister के advisor पश्तून है. हां. तो यह किस किस्म की वह बात करते हैं, मैं यह नहीं कह रहा कि ज़रूर नहीं होते. वही है आपके. बिल्कुल war थी चीज़ें वही हैं. मगर जो यह toxic किस्म की separatist moment start करवाना चाह रहे दूसरा voter. तीसरा target इनका जो है वह वह जो सबसे ज़्यादा लगता है वह है CPAC. Fake news को जो है fake news से fight नहीं करना चाह रहे हैं. Right. यह नहीं हो सकता कि fake news अगले कर रहे और उसका response fake news हो. Fake news का response हमेशा data से होगा, evidence से होगा और उनको expose करके किया जाएगा. Transparency से होगा essentially. Absolutely. Makes a lot of sense.
मुझे यह बताइएगा कि, जब so I was again over the weekend, you know, I was looking at, particularly the American sources, right? And they seem completely shocked at how the things are evolving. You know, ISIS का rise and so on. So, why were the Americans so disconnected and how could they not see this coming? Is this do you think this is like an intelligence failure on their part? Because I mean वही वाली बात है आप Pakistan को blame करते रहें. आप कहेंगे कि Pakistan ने यह किया वह किया है किया भाई हम तो Afghanistan में नहीं थे ना हम तो side पर बैठे हुए हैं. Irrespective of Pakistan's role. The fact is the entire American establishment and the entire you know American army and everything was there. They had a presence in Afghanistan. They had their intelligence assets in Afghanistan. They were the ones talking to the तालिबान in Qatar as well.
Somehow they couldn't see this. Nobody saw it. Nobody saw it coming. You know, this is one of the most important question और यह जो मैं article लिख रहा वह actually take PCGs पर रहूंगी. How could nobody see it? And यह पहली बार नहीं हुआ. Cold war ख़त्म हुई. Nobody sought the cold war ending. Mhmm. Nine eleven आपका हुआ. Nobody was able to see कि somebody from these terrorist groups will come up and do that. And अब यह, देखिए इसके ऊपर बहुत एक interesting story है और बड़ा मज़ेदार data भी आपको दूंगा. US government and खास तौर पर CIA spends $13,000,000,000 in research. अच्छा in research? In research, साल की. अच्छा. तेरह billion dollar का budget है सिर्फ़ research का. Right. लेकिन पूरे Pakistan की economy की size का आपका budget हो उनका है सिर्फ़ research का. उस research के बावजूद हां. हालात यह थे कि आज से तीन हफ़्ता पहले, चार हफ़्ता पहले commentaries यह आ रही थी कि ANSF will be able to hold. Commentaries यह आ रही थी कि काबुल will not fall. दो दिन के अंदर अंदर बुसारा हुआ तो एक चीज़ जो सबसे बड़ा question और अभी Twitter पर debate भी चल रही है वह यह है कि should we then take their analysts and their analysis coming from CNN to think tanks in Washington DC seriously? Yeah. या यह भी वही दारें हैं जो कि American talking words follow करते हैं. Right. More and more it has become obvious and जो कि industry के अंदर लोग हैं, उन्हें पता ही है obvious क्या चीज़ है कि जो policy के scholars हैं ना आपके, we really need to scratch the surface and question them कि आपके analysis एक हफ़्ते में पहले क्या था और अब ऐसे क्यों हो गए हमें? यह difference कहां से आया आपका? कि क्या आप किसी के talking points लेकर बोलते रहे या आपकी अपनी है? मगर इससे ज़्यादा एक deeper चीज़ मैं आपको जो दिक़्क़र करूंगा यहां पर वह यह है कि America lost the war before it even started. और उसकी वजह एक ही है. वजह यह है कि आपका जो fundamental policy design था वह fail failed policy design था. क्योंकि policy design के ऊपर जो basis पर data होती है ना evidence होता है, वह आपका ख़राब था. Right. ख़राब किस तरह से था? आपके पास Afghanistan के experts कितने थे Washington के अंदर जिस वक़्त nine eleven हुआ है? Right. कोई भी नहीं था. आपने किसकी तरफ़ देखा partnership के लिए? Pakistan के लिए. Right. A lot of people think कि Pakistan से partnership यह चाहिए थी कि जी सिर्फ़ glocks, passageway और military deployment. सबसे बड़ी जो Pakistan America को service दे रहा था वह थी advisory. Right. Advisory जो होती है ना कि sir यह कर लें, यह ना करें आप. Because we had that sort of incident for the past. Diaries. सारे experts, सारे local, सारे पश्चून तो आपके इधर बैठे थे. Nine eleven के बाद foreign जब हमने general असानुल हक़ कभी interview किया है कुछ और सा पहले. उन्होंने बड़ी simple सी बात की कि जब हमारी मुलाक़ात हुई पहली आपने अब तालिबान हटा दिया है, मुलाम और भाग गया है, they are on the run. Now is the time in October '12, अब आप जो हैं वह political negotiate करके सोलह सिफ़ाई से निकल जाए because आपने कर लिया जो achieve करना. हां. America said no. दो हज़ार तीन, चार, पांच, छह, सात. Every year Pakistan continue to say that छह सात में America frustrate होकर उल्टा Pakistan को blame करना शुरू करेगी जी. आप बार बार peace की बात करें, आप मिले हुए. हां. Point I am trying to make it is that कि यह जो reason है ना why America got over it is because poor quality analysts in Washington DC. Who cannot even differentiate between पश्तून from ताजिक, from हज़ार that cannot even name full provinces of Afghanistan by the way. I मैं challenge करता आप Afghanistan का कोई expert उठाकर, देखिए और DC के अंदर पूताएंगे जी provinces कितने हैं? America went into Afghanistan with zero skills of the region, zero understanding और सबसे बड़ा उसका issue यह रहा कि चले आप over the time period बीस साल develop कर लेते हैं मगर वह भी नहीं की. Right. बीस साल बाद आज भी आप देखें कितने अगवान centers हैं इनके? कितने अगवान departments हैं वहां पर? किन लोगों को engage किया हुआ है? उन लोगों को engage किया हुआ जो कि अगवान की एक Afghanistan government? The same crooks and the Indian lobbies in Washington. Yeah. वह constantly America को इधर से और इधर से feed करते रहे कि जी मसला Afghanistan नहीं है. मसला आपका Pakistan है. हां. And Pakistan को अच्छी तरह से discredit किया, sideline किया. बारह साल बाद America को realize हो गया कि actually वह ग़लती हमसे हो गई है. Pakistan कह ठीक रहा था. मगर अब क्योंकि आप ख़ुद embarrass हैं, publicly नहीं कह सकते. In private they all agree to this thing कि Pakistan was right on that. मगर यहां पर fundamental failure है आपके American scholars का and यह मैं बात हम अपने circle में भी बात करते हैं. It's about time that Pakistan and पाकिस्तानी अह्वाम यह जो है ना concept कि जी गोरागर है तो उसकी जो हां, यह बहुत important बात है ना कि scholar है तो वह गोरा We need to give up. हमारे अपने scholar हैं, बड़े बड़े ज़हीन लोग हैं, बड़े छे लोग हैं जिनकी sense भी अच्छी है. We should start respecting our own scholars and take advice from them. Yeah, like हम Pakistan में
merit पर लेकर आऐंगे वो क्या बोलते रहे हैं और क्या होता रहा है and you will begin to see कि they are if not worse they are either as bad as our analysts or probably in the case of Afghanistan probably much much worse because they have they don't have the understanding of of the region. वही वाली बात है कि अब Pakistan के बारे में सबसे ज़्यादा expertise होसैन अखानी देते हैं अपने Twitter के ऊपर. अगर वह Washington DC लेना शुरू कर देते हैं he is he has no understanding of what's happening on ground. So so that's definitely there. अच्छा, मुझे यह बताएं कि Pakistan में there's a lot of confusion. The reason being yesterday I was talking to someone, and she was like, listen, like, with the Taliban coming, it it she was actually very very confused but, know, she doesn't have all of the nuance of what's been going on and to be very honest, most people in Pakistan don't simply because of the fact कि हमने वह nuance build ही नहीं किया. हमने वह background build ही नहीं किया. So she was like कि अब तालिबान आ जाएंगे तो Pakistan में, you know, Islamization बहुत ज़्यादा बढ़ जाएगी और Islamabad में suddenly terrorist activities बढ़ जाएंगी. Even we know that the Taliban have killed so many people in Pakistan, how are we, supporting them? ठीक है? Pakistan के context में ना, I wanna I wanna get an understanding कि तेहरी के तालिबान Pakistan, तेहरी के तालिबान और और तालिबान Afghanistan वह ये दो players how do they differentiate? What's the situation and how do you see that evolving now that the तालिबान seem to be coming in par? दूसरा, probably the understanding of कि how do you see this situation evolving for Pakistan, in terms of कि, you know, once the तालिबान are there, do you think कि the the extremist elements in Pakistan will will take that as a as as as like a, you know, a successful case study कि भाई वहां पर भी जनाईस्लामic government आ गई है और हमें भी अब उसके ऊपर लड़ना चाहिए है. What do you think? What are the repercussions socially and then politically on Pakistan now with the evolving situation?
I think यह बहुत बहुत important question है. And I I think it's very important to answer it in a in a way which explains कि actually तरीक़े तालिबान क्या है? और Pakistan क्या है? जिसको TTA कहते हैं, TTA actually नहीं है, अगवान तालिबान के हैं. Right. इसकी वजह यह क्या बहुत misinformation है. बहुत ज़्यादा एक duplicity है इन information and all. देखिए, पहली चीज़ यह एक तरीक़े तालिबान Pakistan and अगवान तालिबान या two different चीज़ें हैं. उनका एक aim है foreign forces out और हम अपनी ख़ुद decide करेंगे कि हम किस किस्म का मुल्क जाते हैं. Right. There is nothing wrong with that. Right. उनके जो मुताल बात हैं उनमें कोई problem नहीं है. That is for them to decide कि what they're doing. दूसरी तरफ़ आ जाए तरीके तालिबान Pakistan. देखिए तरीके तालिबान Pakistan एक वह group है जो कि emerge हुए हमारे आपके वज़ीरिस्तान से. Right. Predominantly मैसूद हैं जो कि war की वजह से कुछ और purposes की वजह से they they became disenchanted and then they started going against terrorist. They started terrorist activities in Pakistan. इनके मुतालबात कोई और है. Right. इनके मुतालबात यह नहीं है कि जी हम इस्लामी हकूमत चाह रहे हैं तो हम यह चाह रहे इनके मुतालबात हैं aggressive against the state. Right. Which is why backing आप देखें, TTP को back कौन करता? हैं, महसूस हैं. इनके साथ आपको बैठकर political like political तरीके से इनके साथ negotiate आपको करके खत्म कर लेने जी बात. जो कि actually more or less TTP खत्म हो चुकी है. Right. Sleeper cells Pakistan के अंदर operate हो रहे हैं. Takeover कर गया है, Afghanistan, तालिबान जो है Afghanistan में takeover किया है तो उसका net result Pakistan में क्या आएगा? एक तासुर भी दिया गया कि net result यह आएगा कि हमारे लोगों को शय पड़ेगी यहां पर और वह उठेंगे और यह वह. Yes and no both. ठीक है? Yes and no both इस वजह से कि जो तालिबान की philosophy है वह external oriented नहीं है. Right. यह कोई अपनी export नहीं करना चाह रहे हैं. Right. वह कह रहे यार हमें हमें बल्कि केला छोड़ दो आप. Right. वह revolutionary mindset नहीं है कि जब हमने revolution यहां लेकर जानी जो कि वहां पर देखकर हालात वह कहेंगे यार हम भी यह चाहते हैं. देखिए यह एक बहुत serious problem है and यह मैं चीज़ first time इधर ही discuss कर रहा हूं मैं भी और वह यह कि Pakistan needs to be very careful. क्यों careful? Because जो Afghanistan के हालात जहां पहुंचे हैं, Afghanistan was not always like this. Neck to each other. Right. एक वह problem. दूसरे सबसे बड़ी problem यह deep rooted corruption. Right. And systemic failure of justice system. Right. Rooted corruption and इंसाफ नहीं मिल रहा हम. अब यह दोनों चीज़ें जो है ना यह बड़ी इदरानी है Pakistan इसी चीज़ें पांच सबसे बड़ा आपको मैं demography बताता हूं क्योंकि हम तो करते ही data है और हम तीसरी चीज़ यह थी a youth bulge. Right. तालिबान के जितने ranks हैं ना वह आपके twenty five years से नीचे नीचे के लोग हैं. हां. अब आप इस same environment को contest को उठाएं Pakistan में. हां. Deep rooted corruption भी है system के अंदर. Right. Justice लोगों को मिलता नहीं है. I fear, मुझे डर लगता है इस बात का कि जो हालात Afghanistan के develop हुए हैं, उनके जो सारे variations हैं और जो core reasons हैं वह Pakistan में भी exist करती है. इस मुल्क के अंदर मगर इदारे जो अच्छी चीज़ है वह यह है कि इदारे हमारे established हैं. We have an army, we have a civil bureaucracy, we have ways to curtail it, curtail some things that can grow but क्या दो साल बाद, तीन साल बाद अगर आपके हमारे systems reforms नहीं लेते, ठीक नहीं होते, आम आदमी को justice नहीं मिल रहा. छोटी सी example दूंगा, I won't name any group. मगर अगर आप एक group जो Punjab के अंदर predominantly grow की है, दो हज़ार पंद्रह में उसकी कितनी थी power? ढाई सौ का मद्रसा था. दो हज़ार सत्रह के अंदर पच्चीस हज़ार. इस वक़्त millions में है. Right. अगर आप यह trend notice करना शुरू करें तो आपको एक चीज़ नज़र आएगी कि जब तक Pakistan अपने system, governance नई चीज़ें ठीक करेगा, चाहे पाकिस्तानों भले Americaओं. मुल्कों के rise and fall of the nations are bent upon these things कि आपने cater नहीं किया अपने आम आदमी को. Right. So, यह चीज़ हो सकती है कि अगर environment ऐसी create हो जाए जहां पर एक भी group जो है वह थोड़ा सा भी आग लगा दे तो you can you can snowball into that. Right. But मुझे एक बहुत बड़ी optimism भी है और वह भी है कि current government भी अच्छा उस पर काम कर रही है कि focus करें youth के ऊपर. Young बच्चों को graduate होते हैं universityओं के ऊपर. उनके बाद कोई hope ही नहीं होगा कि हम करें क्या? काम करने दें. Right. करने दें काम उनको. Let the system play play itself out.
TTP का मैं recently देख रहा था कि they've changed their stance from, you know, कि radical Islamic, you know, marks वह the थोड़ा एक तो marks हो गया. तो उसे यह कि वह, most recently जो उनकी statement आई, it seems like they're now, suddenly changing their stance towards, यह nationalism, पश्तून and बलूच nationalism.
Where do you think that's coming from? Because I know for a fact that they're not they're not smart enough to sort of make that. बड़ी मज़ाक़ चुका है check करें कि TTP के आप Telegram के account सुबह follow करें ना, all of a sudden अंग्रेज़ी आनी शुरू होगी. English, all of a sudden the words that are being used are class sick post colonial words. Ok. जो कि आप use यह oversized state, state oppression and this and that. वह हमें पता है कहां से words आ रहे हैं यह. कौन lines दिखता है? Think tax होते हम लोग research वग़ैरह करते हैं पता लगता है कि यार आपके पिछले दस साल से यह press release थी, उसके format यह थे, language यह थी और छह महीने में आपकी press release change हो गई हुई है. हां. So देखिए backer पीछे कौन है इनका? वह chess पर board move कर रहा है तो शायद इधर से इसको play कर रहे हैं, उसको इधर करके कच्चे कुछ करने की कोशिश कर रहे हैं. It will never work. That I can assure you. Their time is up. अच्छा.
जो अभी recently suddenly rise in terrorist activity and दो context है ना. एक context यह कहता कि oh, because of instability that terrorist activity will increase. दूसरा context यह है कि sleeper cells exist करते थे. अब क्योंकि नज़र आ रहा है कि future कोई नहीं है तो they're just cutting off loose ends. ये ये अभी पिछले दिन आप दिन देखोगे spike थे terrorist activities में. Because all for one purpose. यह एक thread का हिस्सा है. There is no reality to these things. यह last ditch efforts, frustration के तौर पर रोने करने की कोशिश की. वह भी आपके सामने तक इतने कोई कामयाब हुए हैं उसके अंदर. Right. Afghanistan में there's one thing that we do a lot of times in Pakistan कि हम देखते हैं उगान government and हम देखते हैं तालिबान. It's we just put these two black and white situations. The fact is there is a तालिबान. Yes, put them on aside. And within the इफ़ग़ान government, there is the ruling party which is अशरफ़नी and, you know, उनके जो surrounding वह हैं. And then there is a very diverse opposition as well. बीस पैंतीस party हैं वहां पर. बिल्कुल. What's the narrative of the opposition parties at this point in time now that the that Afghanistan is falling? First question. And then second question, do you think, we're going at a point where the Taliban will essentially rule all of Afghanistan? Or do you think Taliban are right now cleansing the old system or rather pushing the old system to the ground? And now post September we will see a renegotiation between the leftover parties which probably would include अब्दुल्लाह अब्दुल्लाह and lot of जो ये बाकी सारे players वहां पर exist करते हैं. And then create sort of like a national government या कोई नया system के बारे में बात होगी. I don't personally I don't see and again जब मैंने जो अफ़गानs were visiting here when I talk to them as well, they were constantly like, you know, why is this idea that anyone who is currently part of the अफ़ग़ान democratic system is is bad versus the तालिबान. Yep. You know, the fact is कि it's a very diverse,
you know, setting in terms of political Afghanistan. So, what do you think is gonna happen? इसमें एक बहुत अच्छी बात की है और बड़ी important distinction है कि Afghanistan की parliament के अंदर बेत तहाशा parties हैं, local parties हैं, regional parties and all of that. हुआ problem क्या है कि एक specific अह्वान elite and अह्वान group very hardcore backed by The Americas. उन्होंने narrative को monopolize कर दिया and उस narrative के अंदर कुछ उन्होंने चीज़ें यह कर दी कि Afghanistan यह है, तालिबान यह है, define कर दिया ना और Pakistan जो है वह फ़साद की जाड़ है. It was deployed to actually fight against their own people. कि जो जो गन्नी camp के अंदर लोग नज़र आ रहे थे ना कि कोई different voice प्यानकार या कोई कुछ कर रहा है, उसको stab करने पर. मगर उसके बावजूद भी Afghanistan के अंदर से ऐसा ऐसा ज़ोर टूटना शुरू हुआ गन्नी का pro Pakistan owner. I don't know that. It's different different. Very different जो voice जो कि पहले से दबाकर रखी गई हुई थी under this very hardcore racial ethnic type of toxic की समझो उनकी वह narrative था उससे हटकर होगी आपकी. जो कि more inclusive होगी in my opinion. Right. Pakistan पिछले सालों से यह बात कह रहे कि थोड़ा सा ऊपर surface ख़ताए ना नीचे वाणिस्थान Pakistan हमारे आपस में भाईचारा BL लोगों की अच्छी है and हम think tax के ऊपर जब engage भी करते हैं इनसे there is no difference. Right. We're we're equally good to each other. So वह एक चीज़ आपकी है. दूसरा वाला जो आपका सवाल है वह है related to? दूसरा वाला essentially यह था कि, you know, once the ताल, once this So, post of one, यह यह post भी settlement structure का है. देखिए this is very hard to imagine कि क्या होगा. मगर, I love reading history and, इस खिते की history, Ackmini the empire से लेकर Alexander, the bacterians, the parthian, जो जो इन्होंने भी rule किया है. One large power जो कि या तो अफ़वान government हो सकती थी या तालिबान. अब अफ़वान government नहीं है तो वह तालिबान के rank and file जो है उसने एक large power provide कर दिया. It will come to the center. It will have an interim setup जहां पर आपकी शूरा eventually बनेगी, जिर्गा बनेगा आपका. वह जिर्गा से क्या होगा आपकी कि एक centralized government bureaucracy जो मुझे लगता है I don't know, I can't speak for तालिबान but I think if I'm thinking from their mind what they will do is that they will retain the Afghanistan bureaucracy. Ok. वह bureaucracy को retain करेंगे, More or less foreign relations को retain करेंगे. जो system है उसको retain रखेंगे. जो justice system है वह take over करके उसको ठीक करेंगे. Right. Local level के ऊपर करेंगे. इनकी strategy यह होगी devolved. Regions के पास power होगी to run their own business with तालिबान's representative. Ideally योना जी जैसे आपका पुराने ज़माने में Persians ने satraps के through किया था. Satrapians होती थी, आप ही के governors होते थे, वह rule करते थे और बड़ा अच्छा system चलता था. I do think तालिबान will probably go with that model because तालिबान कभी भी one system, one fit, sizable वाल नहीं चला सकता वहां पर. Power sharing होगी मगर under the umbrella and protection of तालिबान for some time it is needed as well. Right. You name it. There there so उस proxies को पीछे हटाने के लिए, system को cleanse करने के लिए तालिबान will intervene, will have its major share and all but it will not run the government in a silo. कि जी हमने यह चलानी है. It will have an inclusive setup and it will retain. आप देखेंगे बहुत लोगों को retain रखेंगे. Right. From what I understand from the former setup. मगर I'm assuming they will have to be told कि आप अब different तरीके से चलेंगे. चलेंगे.
I'm I'm gonna move towards the last couple of questions. Refugee crisis का एक आया था. You know, we were constantly thinking कि again, just the civil war that we were imagining was much much worse than what we're seeing right now. And therefore we were thinking that there might be a huge sort of exodus of, refugees again towards Pakistan. It seems to me, based on the way that the advance, the Taliban advances have happened, this time has been has been slightly different at least for now. Now. Yeah. For now. Last time nineties में जब तालिबान आए थे तो उससे पहले बहुत ज़्यादा bloodshed already हो गया हुआ था. It seems like, you know, the overall like we like we talked about कि बहुत सारे different camps हैं. वह camps भी थोड़ा war vary हो चुके हैं. They're just like कि यार, you know, let's just figure out कि next transition क्या है and let's live our own sort of life. And then उसी के साथ साथ I think the तालिबान seem to be a lot more inclusive. उनके अगर language में भी देखा जाए, A lot of times people are saying again मुझे मैं Pakistan वाली चीज़ के ऊपर, fallback करूंगा कि Pakistan में लोग कहेंगे what what if the तालिबान then start adventurism within Pakistan. The fact is they've actively spoken whether it's with Pakistan media, whether it's with China as well कि, you know, we were not going to support the East Turkmenistan Islamic movement. With Pakistan they said you know अफ़ग़ान soil will not be used for any sort of external activity. So there are they are they've modernized themselves in terms of political theory and they're they do understand कि यार ठीक है हमने किस तरह से एक inclusive space बनानी है. First question being कि do you think that Exodus that we were the worst case scenario that we were imagining might not be as bad as we we had thought initially? And then second question, again once falls, तो automatically वहां पर हमें उस वक़्त पता लगेगा कि actual on ground situation है क्या? अभी तो people are still trying to understand कि निज़ाम होगा क्या? अगर, refugees आते हैं and now that the border is fenced, now that is it is much more structured compared to last, not just the last time, but last few times. How do you see the, the Pakistani government, you know, responding to that? Second question. And third, what do you think is the best, solution for these अफ़गानs who are now once again going to be, homeless, who are going to then have to I mean, it's generation after generation absolutely getting destroyed. चाहे हम जितना भी कहते कि no Pakistan में वह आते हैं, सारा कुछ करते हैं but refugees going anywhere.
अभी system fluid है और इसको stabilize होने में साल दो, तीन, चार, पांच लगेंगे आपके और उस time के ऊपर आपका refuge यह नहीं होता कि एक साथ ही आपके बीस लाख आ गए. Important उसमें यह है which is why कि initial stability आपकी आज है. Political settlement जल्दी हो जाए. Pakistan क्यों पीछे पड़ा हुआ political settlement क्यों? जब एक political settlement हो जाएगी ना आपके पास एक card आ जाएगा. तो यार यह चीज़ है जिसकी basis के ऊपर हमने अपने आपको govern करना है. Right. Hope for the future आ जाएगा. जब hope for the future आ जाएगा तो जो आपके local level के ऊपर भी जो politics है ना उसको समझ आ जाएगी कि यार अच्छा we have something to look forward to. लोग याद रखें refugee crisis कब start होते हैं? जब uncertainty होती है. Right. People run when they're uncertain. Right. और when they see a direct bullet coming. Right. Bullet नहीं आ रही. Right. मगर uncertainty जो है वह भी आपके refugee crisis को trigger करा सकती है. अभी uncertainty नहीं है. तालिबान came sweep और business as usual चलता आ रहा है. Mhmm. ठीक है? इन्होंने कई जगहों के ऊपर north के अंदर भी और east north east west side के ऊपर भी इन्होंने जहां take over किए power grades. I'll give you one example. I talk to somebody over there. Power grades were taken over
people are more or less like कि इतना फ़र्क़ नहीं पड़ा हमें. We are fine with that. मैं in fact कल देख रहा था कल एक BBC की report BBC उर्दू की report आई हुई थी कि जी तालिबा ने एक उसमें take over किया है जहां पर radio के ऊपर अब गानी चलना बंद हो गई हो गया. तो एक अफगान ने उसके नीचे आकर verified account था proper journalist था वहां का उसने कहा भाई मैं यहां पर रह रहा हूं. कुछ ऐसा नहीं हुआ takeover हुआ है नीचे business as usual चल रहा है. I don't know why this sort of communication Information. Is
Yeah. So यह एक तो यह वाली आपकी चीज़ है. So Pakistan istan अब क्या कर सकता कि worst case scenario अगर Pakistan से होते देखिए, एक इस चीज़ में मैं वाज़े भीतर करूं कि बार बार अभी आप foreign journalist से देखें, कुछ foreign commentators and academics बात क्या कर रहे हैं? Pakistan should open up its border for a few g's. It's कुछ हमारे भी, हमारे भी कुछ लोगों ने tweets ऐसे किए हैं कि it's so shameful that Pakistan is not helping अवनिस्थान and we should be more courteous and we should be more empathetic and all. इन लोगों यह नहीं पता. तीन million refugees Pakistan में उनके बच्चों के बच्चों के बच्चे भी यहां पर पैदा हुए हैं. हां. Pakistan has supported and provided safety to as many advance as was possible. Right. और मुझे अब हम government तो कह रही है but I'm pretty sure as an academic value look at it हम और को भी कर लेंगे. था, war हम पर लाई गई. हमने नहीं war start की थी, war start करवाई गई थी हम पर ऊपर. हम मना करते रहे कि यार अब political dialogue कर रहे हैं, बीस साल आपने drag किया आज आप यह कह रहे कि जी हमने तो गलती कर ली है, अब आप refuge भी ले लें. हां. All what we are asking is that support us. Right. International community needs to take the responsibility. Yeah. And support Pakistan के जी refugees आऐंगे पांच billion dollar के हमें यहां पर setup बनाकर दें. जो उनकी राशन, उनकी चीज़ें हैं उसको support करें. Otherwise what will happen again? उन्हीं refugees के अंदर से एक new generation of तालिबान emerge होगी. Right. If you want to do that, then let's go for that road. But my point is that और मैं छोटी सी बात करूंगा. If only the international community gets over this narrative that has been established by the अफगान and the Indian government on Pakistan कि यह जो है यह इनके अपने vested interest हैं. Pakistan has no vested interest. This is nonsense जो भी यह बात होता है And if the international community start believing us for what we tell them कि यार यह मसला है, यह हो सकता है और यह नहीं हो सकता. आपके यह हालात जो है ना नात तो यहां तक पहुंचते हैं और जो आगे हालातों ने वह भी बचाए जा सकते हैं. They just have to trust Pakistan on that. Right. Makes a lot of sense. This is gonna be my last question. And, you know, you talked about the international community. You talked about the fact कि यार,
you know, they need to trust Pakistan more. Unfortunately, again, बीस आपने कहा publicly The US doesn't. Internally they do. How do you see The US Pakistan relationship evolving? क्योंकि particularly एक बड़ा alternate Afghanistan तो हो ही रहा है, साथ China और US भी हो रहा है. बिल्कुल बिल्कुल. And we are the flagship of of China's sort of foray into the international world. How do you see Pakistan American, you know, sort of relationship evolving, particularly in the context of the fact के, you know, we are so close with China. The Americans are looking at China as they once looked at Russia. Obviously उसमें यह वाला context भी आता है कि, you know, Pakistan does not necessarily want to jump toward camp. Camps कि जी बस हम China पर चले जाएं, हम US में चले जाएं. Historically we have had a, pro American stance and उसकी वजह से हमारा culture उस तरह से develop हुआ हुआ है. तो it's a very confuse, it's a confusing time. मैं अगर honestly मैं यह कहूंगा यार, just ठीक है you know, Americans ने हमारी बात नहीं मानी. बीस साल हमने सत्तर सत्रह हज़ार जाने गवाईं उनकी जंग की वजह से तो, you know, screw them, let's go towards China. It's not as simple as that. Yeah. What do you think is gonna happen with Pakistan and America in the coming days? And, how do you think does China and the Quad affect that sort of relationship?
बड़ा interesting और बड़ा complicated सवाल है because उसके बाद किताबें लिखी गई हैं. किताबें तो ख़ैर कम propaganda ज़्यादा लिखा गया है. We won't call them a serious academic work. Pakistan का जो relation है ना America के साथ उसको बड़ी different चीज़ों से यह थोड़ा सा propaganda हटाएं ना यह जो ऊपर लेकर propaganda है. तो आपको एक चीज़ नज़र आएगी वहां से और वह यह है कि Pakistan and America के एक strategic ties थे throughout रहे cold war में और रहेंगे. Right. मेरी वह statement बोल रहा हूं जो कि a lot of people might not agree कि हालात में America और यह वह. A lot of people tend to say कि हमारा जो America के साथ relationship है वह सिर्फ़ third party related रहा है. Right. या तो nineteen fifties में Iran से related था, उसके बाद cold war से related, Cold War interest Soviet में आपका आ गया. उसके बाद आपका nuclear related हो गया. उसके बाद आपके यह nine eleven के बाद ताल बानल कायदा related हो गया. So we don't really have a relation. That's not true. देखिए सत्तर साल जब आप इसी के साथ engage किया होता है ना security related, war related. आपकी एक institutionalized relationships develop हो चुके होते हैं. हमारी यह ग़लती जो रही है, वह America के साथ यह रही है कि हमारे foreign relations, not just America के साथ overall भी. हमारे foreign relationships हैं based on personalities and peoples, persons, foreign policy जो institutionalize हो. इदारा to इदारा. Mhmm. Pakistan के अंदर जो US relations हैं ना वह आपके हैं यह दो इदारों के beach में more or less. Pentagon and the Pakistan army. Two institutionalize them and throughout the cold war they were close to each other. So वह आपका एक lever develop हुआ है. हमारा काम क्या है कि वह जो securitized relationship है ना और जो militarized relationship है, going forward हमने उसको desecuritize करके balance करना है economic relation के साथ and people to people relationships के साथ. जब तक ये दो angle नहीं होंगे तो आपका हमेशा वो तालुक रहेगा सिर्फ़ military और security हुए. कल कुमरीक़ा ने कहीं और फ़ंस गया किसी जगह तो Pakistan की advisory चाहिए होगी या Pakistan की help चाहिए होगी. देखिए Pakistan is a responsible international actor. चाहे people believe it or not because of the propaganda, Pakistan has provided in the cold war the largest service to the international and the western community. वह क्या थी? आपने Vietnam का भी इंजाम लिया और सबसे बढ़कर आपने Berlin Wall, you were the final one who actually dealt it. So वह आपने दिए. Pakistan has been a responsible actor since then. Even war on terror के अंदर आपने पूरा अलकायदा का network जो है जो Biden ने speech की है president ने कि जी हमारा जो goal of the war था वह complete हो गए once we took down अलकायदा network. He forgot to mention कि अलकायदा network America ने नहीं take down किया. Pakistan ने किया. 900 अलकायदा operators were arrested by Pakistan and sent to wherever they were sent. हमने उनको provide किया है और not just America's. I want to differentiate that. International community. एक event हुआ nine eleven, radicalization, terrorism आई. Pakistan played the biggest role in that और जिसकी वजह से हमने जाने की वही चीज़ें किया. हमने उसके ऊपर सब कुछ provide किया. अब moving forward हमारी बात यह है कि what we want is that America के साथ अब हम sustainable ties जाते हैं beyond security, beyond military. America की उसके ऊपर अपनी reluctance होती है कि how they frame us in their corner? But मैं आपको एक भी बात बता दूं NVA मैं openly यह बात कहता हूं. कल भी यह बात की है, personality. America needs us 10 times more than Pakistan needs America. यह fact है वह आपको क्यों bully करते हैं, चीज़ें करते हैं because the fact that they want to have that bargaining power. We will not call, we will not do this, we not. They make you feel that you are not important. Right. The truth is आज Pakistan America के साथ relationship switch off कर ले. America could not have done a thing in Afghanistan. So यह Pakistan का ही उनको दिया गया हुआ एक gift है एक graceful exit and advisory भी उनकी and I do personally think कि moving forward जब आपका यह US China का एक कम, bipolar power competition होगा, Pakistan can play such an important role in that because Pakistan speaks the Chinese language. Right. We've dealt with them. We've partnered with them. It's one of our most allies of the allies. And we understand the American system, their weaknesses, their strengths and their anxieties. The role Pakistan can play as a facilitator between China and America is so important और वह पता है क्यों important हो to avoid another war. Right. Proxy wars from breaking out. And अगर यह बात America को समझ आ जाए तो they'll see Pak in Pakistan not just a strategic ally but a strategic friend. Right. Because हमारे यहां पर तो आपको पता है ना थोड़ा सारा कल भी मैं अपने America में एक think tanker को भी बात करता कि you need to understand the culture of our society. We don't believe in strategic alliances. We believe in friendships. And in terms of friendships, फिर वह जानवी कुर्बान कर देते हैं. So, there is a cultural difference in that. And I do think Pakistan and America have very bright future of four ties. It's just that we need to institutionalize them in a right way. Right, ज़बरदस्त. हुसैन, thank you so much for this, very very insightful session.
Situation ऐसे evolve कर रही है. It seems like, honestly, you know, आज we're we're recording this on a Sunday. It's gonna be live on Monday night. I don't know case में क्या चीज़ें चाहिए हम up and down हो चुकी होंगी. But, would love to have you over again for you guys. Do let me know if, you know, you would want to see doctor हुसैन अदीम here on the show again, what you'd like for me to ask him.
But, yeah, thank you so much for coming. My pleasure to be here and let's hope that things in Abacus sun turn out to be peaceful and
एक अच्छी transition हो जाए for the people of Afghanistan. For the people of Afghanistan and for for the entire region to be very honest. It does affect everybody else as well. Thank you so much and for all of you guys, you so much for watching. अगर आपके पास episode पसंद आई तो दोस्तों यहां से ज़रूर share करिएगा. YouTube वाले like button the bank engagement बढ़ेगी. What are your thoughts? कि किस तरह से situation को evolve होना चाहिए था या होना चाहिए है? But anyways, this was सईम ज़मीरा संजय. You were watching Thought Behind Thanks. Thank you so much for watching and I'll see you in the next one.
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